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The development of self-learning computers raises
many challenging legal and ethical questions
about the relationship between humans and
computers, humans'control--or lack of it
-- over computers, and accountability for the
computers' activities. While these issues have
long captivated our interest, few would envision
the day when these developments (and the legal
and ethical challenges raised by them) would
become an antitrust issue. With the accelerating
development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and
sophisticated pricing algorithms, they are set to
change the competitive landscape and the nature
of competitive restraints. (Oustconsider Wal-Mart's
acquisition ofjet.com.1)
No doubt the technological developments in
e-commerce, computers, Big Data, and pricing
algorithms have lessened our reliance on local
offerings and in doing so, contributed to our
welfare-with lower prices, better products and
greater choice. Andyet, as our recently published
book, Virtual Competition: The Promise and Perils
of the Algorithm-Driven Economy, 2 explores, new
anticompetitive strategies, including behavioural
discrimination, algorithm driven collusion and the
super-platforms' abuse of their gate keeper power,
may emerge.

I
2

http://www.cnbc.com/2016/08/09/wal-mart-ceo-doug-mcmillonon-what-he-saw-in-jetcom.html
HU,2016. See: http://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.phpisbn-9780674545472&co nte nt-reviews
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In what follows we focus on the strategic use of
algorithms to stabilise and foster tacit collusion.
The concerns these strategies raise have been
acknowledged by competition enforcers.
Commissioner Vestager warned recently of
the antitrust impact of pricing algorithms. In
a speech at the Bundeskartellamt she referred
to virtual competition and the riskthat online
technologies may aid illegal pricing.3 The European
Commission has also acknowledged these risks in
its Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector
Inquiry andthe possibility that price monitoring
software may be used to facilitate explicit or tacit
4
collusion.
As pricing mechanisms shift to pricing algorithms,
so too will the types of collusion. We are shifting
from the world where executives expressly collude
in smoke-filled hotel rooms to a world where
pricing algorithms continually monitor and adjust
to each other's prices and market data. The press,
and competition officials in the EU6 and US' are
Lewis Crofts and Matthew Newman 'Vestager warns of pricing
algorithms'antitrust impact'MLex, 16 March 2017; full speech
available on the European Commission website http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/index en.html
4 Commission staff working document - Preliminary Report on the
E-commerce Sector Inquiry, Brussels, 15.9.2016 SWD(201 6) 312 inal
5 See, e.g., https://www.ft.com/content/9de9fb80-cd23-1 e6-864f20dcb35cede2
6 http://www.autoritedelaco nc rrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddata nal.pdf; http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
d201 516/dselect/deucom/1 29/1 2908.htm; Nicholas Hirst,Vestager eyes new frontiers for antitrust, Politico, 2113/17, 2:12 PM CET
7 https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2015/06/
sharing-economy-issues-facing-platforms-participants-regulators;
3
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already taking note. One concern is over how
algorithms may operate in stealth mode-behind
the scene-to sustain and support collusion,
leaving us-the customers-with the illusion of
competition. "Finding ways to prevent collusion
between self-learning algorithms might be one
of the biggest challenges that competition law
enforcers have ever faced," the OECD recently
observed."

help the colluders collude. The U.(. and U.S. have
already prosecuted such cases. Indeed, before
'Black Friday, one of the busier times of theyear for
online sales, the U.K.'s Competition and Markets
Authority reminded online sellers'that discussing
and agreeing price levels with competitors is
illegal, and can result in serious penalties.", The
CMA also warned that'[r]e-pricing software can be
used to encourage healthy competition amongst
online sellers, but it's illegal to use it as part of a
price-fixing agreement.2 Likewise, William Baer,
the then assistant attorney general at the U.S.
Department of] ustice stated, "We will not tolerate
anticompetitive conduct, whether it occurs in
a smoke-filled room or over the Internet using
complex pricing algorithms.,13

Before we explore algorithmic collusion, it is
important to stress that Big Data and technological
innovations are neither good, bad, nor neutral:
their nature depends on how firms employ them,
whether their incentives are aligned with our
interests, and certain market characteristics9
We are not Luddites. We do not challenge
technological advancement. But we are not
techno-utopians either. We accept the possibility
of new forms of collusion and the current laws'
limitations in deterringthem.
i.

But once we deviate from the simple scenario of
express collusion, the illegality becomes murkier.
As our commercial environment increasingly
moves online, competitors might achieve the
same anticompetitive outcome without agreeing
to tamper with prices. The industry-wide use of
algorithms, under certain market conditions,
may lead to tacit collusion. Importantly, the
conditions for tacit collusion, as several economists
have noted, 'need not involve any"collusion" in
the legal sense, and in particular need involve
no communication between the parties. It is
referred to as tacit collusion only because the
outcome (in terms of prices set or quantities
produced, for example) may well resemble that
of explicit collusion or even of an official cartel."4
Consequently, the rational, unilateral adoption
by each firm to rely on pricing algorithms, and
the concomitant increase in market transparency,
may escape antitrust scrutiny. This isbecause tacit
collusion, as the United States Supreme Court
observed in Brooke Group Ltd. v.Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., is legal:

Tacit Collusion on Steroids

Industries are shifting from a pricing environment
where store clerks stamped prices on products, to
dynamic, differential pricingwhere sophisticated
computer algorithms rapidly calculate and update
prices. Today, the majority of EU retailers track
online prices- predominantly via automated
software programmes developed for that
purpose; nearly 8o% of those using such software
consequently adjust their own prices to those of
their competitors (sometimes on an automatic
basis). 1 Manufacturers can more easily monitor
deviations from "recommended" retail prices, using
software that reports (sometimes with immediate
alerts) on how much, and for how long, prices
diverge from the recommended retail price (or
another reference price).
As companies increasingly use algorithms and Big
Data to price goods, what are the implications on
collusion? One simple scenario is that algorithms
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"[T]acitcollusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price
coordination or conscious parallelism, describes the
process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a
concentrated market might in effect share monopoly
power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing,
supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared
economic interests and their interdependence with
respect to price and output decisions and subsequently
unilaterally set their prices above the competitive
level.,,"
For tacit coordination to be sustainable over
time, several conditions are needed: "First, the
coordinating firms must be able to monitor
to a sufficient degree whether the terms of
coordination are being adhered to. Second,
discipline requires that there is some form
of credible deterrent mechanism that can be
activated if deviation isdetected. Third, the
reactions of outsiders, such as current and
future competitors not participating in the
coordination, as well as customers, should not
be able to jeopardise the results expected from
the coordination.16 As one European case notes,
"there must be an incentive not to depart from
the common policy on the market."17 Among the
characteristics of markets susceptible to tacit
collusion, companies must be able to effectively
retaliate when a competitor seeks a relative
advantage by discounting. The retaliation must
be "sufficiently likely and costly to outweigh the
short-term benefits from 'cheating' on the collusive
path.",1s In addition, to sustain tacit collusion,
potential competitors or customers should not
be in a position to jeopardize the results expected
from the common policy. One would therefore
expect tacit collusion in highly concentrated
markets involving homogenous products where
buyers can not exert buyer power, and the market
in general is characterized by high entry barriers,19
although that isquestionable.20
SBrooke"
Gro Itd. v B

tS8M
'i.l. :!aoC1
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509 US

Of course, not all markets will be ripe fortacit
collusion. But the industry-wide use of pricing
algorithms may increase the number of instances
in which tacit collusion may be sustained. As we
explore in Virtual Competition the endemic use of
similar (or identical) algorithms can transform
a previously competitive market to new market
conditions, which owing to the similarity of the
algorith ms, greater transparency, and the speed
of competitive responses, enable durable tacit
collusion and higher prices.

As each seller shifts to pricing algorithms, the
demand for digitized market information and
transparency will increase. More market data
will be digitalized and accessible, and market
transparency will likely increase. Consumers and
rival algorithms will immediately see each firm's
current price and terms online. As the algorithms
process the increasing flow of market data, each
company's algorithm can better assess its and
its rivals' sales, and whether its lost sales are due
to an overall lower level of demand or due to a
competitor's initiatives, such as offering"secret
discounts" not reflected in the posted online price.
Speed iscritical to sustain the online tacit
collusion. When pricing istransparent, computers
can rapidly police deviations, and calculate
the profit implications of myriad moves and
counter-moves to punish deviations.21 The speed
of calculated responses effectively deprives
discounting rivals of any significant sales. The
greater the improbability that the first-mover
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will benefit from its discounting, the greater the
likelihood of tacit collusion. As competitors' prices
shift online, their algorithms can assess and adjust
prices-even for particular individuals at particular
times and for thousands of products-within
milliseconds.22 Thus if each algorithm can swiftly
match a rival's discount and eliminate its incentive
to discount in the first place, the "threat of future
retaliation keeps the coordination sustainable."23
Each algorithm can learn that any price reductions
will be quickly detected and punished. On the
other hand, the speed also means that collusion
can be signalled in a matter of seconds. The
algorithms can learn that price increases (when
sustainable) will yield greater profits if they follow.
In an environment dominated by similar pricing
algorithms that are aware of opportunities to
4
foster interdependence, one risk is higher prices.
The stability needed for tacit collusion isfurther
enhanced by the fact that computer algorithms
are unlikely to exhibit human biases. As the
European Commission observed, "Coordination
is more likely to emerge if competitors can easily
arrive at a common perception as to how the
coordination shouldwork. Coordinating firms
should have similarviews regardingwhich actions
would be consideredto be in accordance with
the aligned behaviour andwhich actions would
not."25 Human biases, of course, may be reflected
in the programming code. But biases will not
necessarily affect decisions on a case-by-case basis:
a computer does not fear detection and possible
financial penalties or incarceration; nor does it
respond in anger.26 "We're talking about a velocity
of decision-making that isn't really human,"
says Terrell McSweeny, a commissioner with the
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US Federal Trade Commission (FTC)."AII of the
economic models are based on human incentives
and what we think humans rationally will do. It's
entirely possible that not all of that learning is
necessarily applicable in some of these markets.""2
Consider the effect then when each competitor
in an industry adopts a pricing algorithm which
isset to conform with tacit collusion (follow price
increase, punish deviations). Even if the computer
is not specifically programmed to tacitly collude,
the algorithms, through trial-and-error, can arrive
at that outcome when they have a similar goal
(profit maximization) and access to each other's
prices and other key market data. The algorithms
will likely engage in "predictive analytics"-that
is,the study of patterns in pricing and commercial
decisions. Such an analysis will enable firms to
combine "real-time, historical and third-party
data to build forecasts of what will happen in
their business months, weeks or even just hours
in advance. 2s That technology would enable
"moving away from 'systems of record' to 'systems
of engagement' that use predictive analytics to cut
through the noise in big data and uncover insights
29
that can be acted on.1
One would expect a market norm to emerge.
When dynamic pricingyields a competitive
advantage, no firm can afford the time gap to
assess whether the algorithm's suggested price
should be implemented. The firm relies on the
pricing algorithm precisely because it is ineffective
for humans to independently analyze all the
underlying market data to calculate prices (or
discounts) on many products. If the whole purpose
of dynamic pricing is to update prices quickly so
as to reflect market demand, market participants
will likely expect the price posted online to be
the actual price. Some buyers may continue to
haggle, but the norm develops that the algorithmdetermined posted price isthe actual price.
Ironically, even if some companiesyearn for the
days of printed list prices and secretive discounts,
they may switch to pricing algorithms to prevent
being at a competitive disadvantage.
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2

Enforcement Chalenges

We first raised algorithmic tacit collusion in 2015.30
Since then technology and the use of dynamic
pricing have advanced. So too policymakers
and competition agencies are paying greater
attention to the risks posed by algorithmic pricing.
The U.. House of Lords, for example, noted
now the rapid developments in data collection
and data analytics have created the potential
for new welfare reducing and anti-competitive
behaviour, including new forms of collusion. They
recommended that the European Commission
co-ordinate further research regarding the effects
that algorithms have on the accountability of
online platforms and the implications of this for
enforcement.31 In its 2016 Preliminary Report on
the E-commerce Sector Inquiry 2 the European
Commission noted the rise in use of monitoring
algorithms:
'About half of the retailers track online prices of
competitors. Inaddition to easily accessible online
searches and price comparison tools, both retailers and
manufacturers report about the use ofspecific price
monitoring software, often referred to as "spiders",
crea ted either by third party software specialists or by
the companies themselves. This software crawls the
internet and gathers large amounts ofprice related
information. 67 % of those retailers that track online
prices use (also) automatic software programmes
for that purpose. Largercompanies have a tendency
to track online prices of competing retailersmore
than smallerones... some software allows companies
to monitorseveralhundredonline shops extremely
rapidly,if not in real time... Alert functionalities in
price monitoringsoftware allow companies to get
alerted as soon as a retailer'sprice isnot in line with a
predefined price."33
The Commission acknowledged that, among other
things, "increased price transparency through price
monitoring software may facilitate or strengthen
(both tacit and explicit) collusion between retailers

by making the detection of deviations from the
collusive agreement easier and more immediate.
This, in turn, could reduce the incentive of retailers
to deviate from the collusive price by limiting the
expected gains from such deviation. 14 The French
and German competition authorities similarly
noted in their 2016 joint report, Competition Law and
Data, that:
"Even though market transparency as a facilitating
factor for collusion has been debated for several
decades now, itgains new relevance due to technical
developments such as sophisticated computer
algorithms. For example, by processing all available
information and thus monitoring and analyzing or
anticipating their competitors' responses to current
and future prices, competitors may easier be able to
find a sustainable supra-competitive price equilibrium
which they can agree on."35
Commenting on these possible scenarios, the
OECD noted in 2016 that these strategies "may
pose serious challenges to competition authorities
in the future, as it may be very difficult, if not
impossible, to prove an intention to coordinate
'6

prices, at least using current antitrust tools.1

Competition law, in mostjurisdictions, requires
proof of an agreement among the competitors to
change the market dynamics. The unilateral use
of algorithms to monitor price will not amount
to an illegal agreement or concerted practice.
A rational reaction by competitors to market
dynamics, in itself, is legal. When such legal
behavior, absent communication or agreement,
leads to an equilibrium above competitive levels,
it does not trigger antitrust intervention. After all,
one cannot condemn a firm for behaving rationally
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and interdependently.,, If the algorithms increase
market transparency, defendants will often have an
independent legitimate business rationale fortheir
conduct. Courts and the enforcement agencies may
be reluctant to restrict this flow of information
in the marketplace. Its dissemination, observed
the U.S. Supreme Court, "is normally an aid to
commerce,"3 and "can in certain circumstances
increase economic efficiency and render markets
more, rather than less, competitive."3 9 Indeed,
concerted action to reduce price transparency may
itself be an antitrust violation.40

anspareny advne
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for widely used consumer electronics products
such as household appliances, notebooks and
hi-fi products." According to the Commission, "The
effect of these suspected price restrictions may be
aggravated due to the use by many online retailers
of pricing software that automatically adapts retail
prices to those of leading competitors. As a result,
the alleged behaviour may have had a broader
impact on overall online prices for the respective
consumer electronics products."41 Another
example is if firms agreed to standardize their
products with the primary aim of facilitating tacit
collusion amongtheir pricing algorithms.

So, what actions might enforcers considerto deter
online tacit collusion?
To begin with, enforcers should distinguish
between pure forms of tacit collusion (which is
nothing more than a unilateral rational reaction
to market characteristics), and instances in which
illicit concerted practice has "contaminated" or
"facilitated" tacit collusion.
At times, the unilateral nature of the action
may be questioned and either a horizontal or
vertical agreement may be inferred. Indeed,
as part of its investigation into suspected
anticompetitive practices in e-commerce, the
European Commission is investigating such
possible illicit collusion, namely whether' Asus,
Denon & Marantz, Philips and Pioneer have
breached EU competition rules by restricting the
ability of online retailers to set their own prices

On the other hand, condemning pure tacit
collusion -i.e., without any concerted practice
or agreement- ismore challenging. Could
the competition agency and court impute
an illicit agreement or understanding when
the competitors use similar algorithms that
collectively dampen competition? 42 Might it
treat any posting of price online as a signal or
communication? Arguably not when such practices
provide much needed information to customers,
enable them to exercise choice, and thus are
common and necessary in the online marketplace.
When algorithmic dynamic pricing has become

,

37 See, 'or exam'ple_Case C-1 99/92, P Hils AG v. Com~missionq, [1999g]
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the industry standard, abstaining from the use of
advanced pricing algorithms may be irrational;
it would be as if an investment bank or hedge
fund insisted on human floor traders, when most
trading isautomated.
Instead of challenging the tacit collusion itself,
an alternative enforcement approach may be to
focus on the change in market dynamics. While
the mutual price monitoring at the heart of tacit
collusion is legal under competition law, one
may ask whether the creation of such a dynamic
through "artificial" means justifies to antitrust
intervention. This approach would condemn
the creation of a transparent market in which
monitoring and punishment mechanisms are
present. Its application may be possible through
various channels:
Unfair practice
For instance, the FTC can bring claims under
Section 5 of the FTC Act, without evidence of an
agreement, only a showing of an "unfair practice."
Many U.S. states have a similar statute. But the
FTC has been unsuccessful in bringingthese
"facilitating practices" claims, as isevident in
Boise Cascade 4 and Ethyl. 4 4 If the court adopts the
standard in Ethyl, the FTC would need to show
either (1)evidence that defendants tacitly or
expressly agreed to use pricing algorithms to avoid
competition, or (2) oppressiveness, such as (a)
evidence of defendants' anticompetitive intent
or purpose or (b) the absence of an independent
legitimate business reason for the defendants'
conduct.41 Accordingly, defendants may be liable
if, when developing the algorithms or in seeing
the effects, they were (1)motivated to achieve an
anticompetitive outcome, or (z) aware of their
actions' natural and probable anticompetitive
consequences.

If the executives, for example, call their algorithm
Gravy, tinker with it to better manipulate the
market, and boast about this in their internal
e-mails-as inthe U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) case againstAthena Capital
Research-liability could be established.46The
Athena case isillustrative. In 2014, the SEC for the
first time sanctioned the high-frequency trading
firm for using complex computer programs to
manipulate stock prices. 47 The sophisticated

algorithm, code-named Gravy, engaged in a
practice known as "marking the close" in which
stocks were bought or sold near the close of trading
to affect the closing price: "[t] he massive volumes
of Athena's last-second trades allowed Athena to
overwhelm the market's available liquidity and
artificially push the market price-and therefore
the closing price-in Athena's favor. 4 Athena's
employees, the SEC alleged, were "acutely aware
of the price impact of its algorithmic trading,
' 49
calling it'owningthe game' in internal e-mails.
Athena employees "knew and expected that Gravy
impacted the price of shares it traded, and at
times Athena monitored the extent to which it did.
For example, in August 2008, Athena employees
46 U.S Securities a.nd Exchan ge Commission, Adm ristrative Proceedin(,, ble No 3-1619) (October 16,
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Another approach may be to consider the use of
such algorithms as market manipulation. This
approach has its obstacles; yet one could imagine
legislation that targets "abuse" of excessive
transparency, possibly where clear anticompetitive
intent is present.
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compiled aspreadsheet containing information on
the price movements caused by an early version of
Gravy."0 Athena configured its algorithm Gravy "so
that it would have a price impact."1

In calling its market-manipulation algorithm
Gravy, and by exchanging astring of incriminating
e-mails, the company did not help its case. Without
admitting guilt, Athena paid a $1million penalty.
This demonstrates that automated trading has
the potential to increase market transparency
and efficiency, but it can also lead to market
manipulation.2

Finding the predominant purpose for using an
algorithm will not always be straightforward.
Athena, for example, challenged the SEC's
allegations that it engaged in fraudulent activity:
"While Athena does not deny the Commission's
charges, Athena believes that its trading activity
helped satisfy market demand for liquidity
during a period of unprecedented demand for
such liquidity.""$ A court might agree. Companies,
learning from Athena, may be more circumspect in
their e-mails.14
Structural change
Another approach may focus on the deterring
structural changes that foster tacit collusion. As
one U.S. court observed, "Tacit coordination is
SJ
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tri
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feared by antitrust policy even more than express
collusion, for tacit coordination, even when
observed, cannot easily be controlled directly by
the antitrust laws. It isa central object of merger
policy to obstruct the creation or reinforcement by
merger of such oligopolistic market structures in
which tacit coordination can occur."" Thus stronger
merger control, in particular, may be an option.
The agencies can be more sensitive to whether
the elimination of a particular player would
increase significantly the risk of algorithmic tacit
collusion. This would require a more sophisticated
understanding of the factors contributing to
tacit collusion. It may be preserving a market of
diverse sellers with different horizons for profits
and different capacity constraints. It may be
scrutinizing conglomerate mergers when multimarket contact softens competition."6 Natural
experiments would come into play, to see how the
algorithms behaved in similar markets where entry
or exit occurred.
Merger control, however, won't work when other
factors (such as the shift to algorithmic pricing
itself,or firms exiting unilaterally) foster tacit
collusion. So, another approach might be to use
ex-ante or ex-post mechanisms to audit the firms'
algorithms to assess when they may result in the
active changing of market dynamics. For example,
before a firm can use its pricing algorithm, the
competition authority could activate it in a"sand
box" where its effects with the other firms' existing
algorithms will be observed.
The obstacles to this approach are evident.
Commercial secrecy and the impracticalities of
auditing self-learning algorithms are likely to make
this an inferior option at present. The self-learning
algorithm may price competitively in the sandbox,
but through repeated interactions in the field may
learn of new strategies. Unlike a merger, one may
find it difficult, if not impossible, to identify clear
thresholds for intervention and legality once these
algorithms are operating in the market. Further,
one wonders which counterfactuals could be used
when consideringthe effects of such algorithms?
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Counter measures
Rather than legally challenge tacit collusion,
policymakers or consumer organizations may
attempt to actively destabilize it.
One set of counter-measures involves market
structure. Entry, according to the empirical
economic literature, helps destabilize express
collusion s7Thus one avenue to explore is whether
promoting entry by mavericks and reducing
regulatory entry barriers would destabilize
algorithmic collusion.
A second set of counter-measures involves limiting
transparency to the buyers' advantage. The
government may explore, for example, whether
giving buyers call options on multiple sellers
helps destabilize sellertacit collusion.," Here the
buyer, but not the rivals, learns the price of each
seller for a future order. The government can also
target public policies that help facilitate collusion
without necessarily improving the buyers' welfare.
As former FTC Chair Bill Kovacic observed:
'Amajor example isthe process for opening bids in a
sealed bid procurement. Bids ordinarily are unsealed
in a public setting and are displayed for all offerors to
observe. This procedure enables cartel participants
to determine whether their co-conspirators abided
by the terms of their agreement to rotate bids or
otherwise suppress rivalry.An obvious reform would
be to permit inspection ofbids by aguardian internal
to the purchasing organization, such as an inspector
general. This simple measure would complicate the
detection of cheating by cartel members and still
ensure that the winning offeror has been identified

correctly."59
A third set of counter-measures would entail
increasing the incentives to deviate. Smaller buyers
can test whether poolingtheir orders into less
frequent, less predictable larger orders yields a
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Counter-measures pose challenges at both
policy and practical levels. To begin with, most
enforcement agencies are not likely to favor
ongoing intervention and manipulation of market
dynamics. A regulatory approach to reduce
transparency may prove difficult. One may find it
difficult to fine-tune the enforcement policy aimed
at condemning"excessive" market transparency
or undermine the collusive equilibrium. Further,
such intervention will likely leadto an arms race
between sellers and buyers. The former may
likely benefit from resources and technological
advantage. With the ability to rely on advanced
algorithms to change the market dynamics and the
possibilityto use artificial intelligence to perfect
the strategy, could competition law enforcers
effectively identify and target such strategies?

3. Conclusion
Lord David Currie of the U.K. Competition and
Markets Authority observed in a recent speech
that, "the rise of the algorithmic economy raises
potentially difficult questions for competition
policy":
'Algorithms can provide a very effective way ofalmost
instantly coordinating behaviour, possibly in an anticompetitive way. Where algorithms are designed by
humans to do so, this ismerely a new form of the old
practice ofprice-ixing. But machine learning means
that the algorithms may themselves learn that coordination isthe best way to maximise longer-term
business objectives. In that case, no human agent
has planned the co-ordination. Does that represent
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algorithms or other mechanisms forjoint
consumer bargaining or protection may try to
undermine the collusive equilibrium or affect
levels of transparency. Consumer-friendly
algorithms seeking to maximize consumer surplus
could play against seller algorithms seeking to
maximize profits.
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abreach ofcompetition law? Does the law stretch to
cover sins of omission as well as sins ofcommission: the
failure to build insufficient constraints on algorithmic
behaviour to ensure that the algorithm does not
learn to adopt anti-competitive outcomes?And what
if constraints are built in but they are inadequately
designed, so that the very clever algorithm learns a
way through the constraints? How far can the concept
ofhuman agency be stretched to cover these sorts of
issues? Ihave suggested earlier that the competition
tools at our disposal can tackle the competition issues
that we face in the new digital world, but perhaps this
last issue which I have touched on isone where this
proposition isnot true. "6,

As Lord Currie recognized, the EU and US enforcers
currently cannot tackle the tacit collusion
scenarios. These developments raise challenging
technical, enforcement, and legal questions.63
In its Preliminary Report on the E-commerce Sector
Inquiry, the European Commission expressed
its increasing concern that monitoring software,
excess transparency and advanced algorithms
may be used to facilitate online collusion. US and
European competition officials are increasingly
warning of the anticompetitive impact pricing
64
algorithms can have on virtual competition.
These indications from the enforcers are
encouraging. No doubt, many challenges must
still be addressed at the legal, policy and technical
levels to ensure optimal enforcement. And yet,
ignoringthe challenges is irresponsible. The goal
ultimately is a data-driven economythat's inclusive
and promotes our overall wellbeing, not one where
profit-maxing algorithms (and oligopolies and
oligopsonies) reign supreme.

The current online markets are far from perfect
competition. The invisible hand that we rely upon
can be pushed aside by the "digitized hand." The
digitized hand has the capacity to be selective and
generate different levels of competitive pressure.
The resulting environment, with rules different
from the ones we assume in the theoretical
economic models, can yield new forms of
anticompetitive behavior. Tacit collusion will likely
become more common. The nature of electronic
markets, the availability of data, the development
of similar algorithms, and the stability and
transparency they foster, will likely push some
markets that were just outside the realm of tacit
collusion into interdependence.2
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